Interpretive theories in political science by Kułakowska, Małgorzata
Małgorzata Kułakowska
Jagiellonian University
Interpretive Theories in Political Science
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to present the premises of the interpretative appro-
ach, with its internal diversity and methodological implications. While the first part of 
the paper discusses possible meanings connected with the concept of an interpretive 
approach, the second focuses on methodological implications and choices inspired by 
interpretivism.
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The promise of interpretive political science
In the preface to his monumental work on interpretive political science (ed. Bev-
ir, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d), Mark Bevir characterized it by analyses of mean-
ings of human actions, techniques of textual analysis and ethnography, particu-
lar topics such as cultural practices and identities and finally particular dialogical 
and collaborative approaches to public policies (2010a, p. xix). I believe this in-
troductory description unveils the value of interpretivism in political science 
(cf. Filipowicz, 2015; Bachryj-Krzywaźnia, 2016b). When talking about topics 
privileged by interpretive theories, Bevir mentioned studies of beliefs, identities 
and cultural practices and traditions (2010a, p. vii). Given the interpretive turn, 
highlighting the significance of meaning in social sciences (Yanow, Schwartz-
Shea, 2015), it can only be expected that the discussion between positivist and 
interpretivist approaches would continue enriching political science research.
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The premises of the interpretive approach
Paul Furlong and David Marsh in their chapter “A skin not a sweater: ontolo-
gy and epistemology in political science” (2010) analysed interpretivism in the 
context of ontological and epistemological questions within political science. 
They described two broad ontological positions, one labelled as foundational-
ism/objectivism/realism, positing the existence of the so-called ‘real’ world, “in-
dependent of our knowledge of it” (2010, p. 185), and the second called anti-
foundationalism/constructivism/relativism, assuming that the world is socially 
constructed. They proceeded to show how ontology influences epistemology 
and in turn methodological choices, so an anti-foundationalist ontology might 
be seen as leading to an interpretivist epistemology and preference for qualita-
tive methods (2010, p. 186). They emphasized how contested this theoretical de-
bate is, which is also reflected by the diversity of names and labels used by schol-
ars to describe their ontological and epistemological positions.
The diversity of names and labels mentioned by Furlong and Marsh (2010) 
can be easily spotted through the literature review. We may then discuss inter-
pretivism also in the context of two models for conducting research/science 
(Krauz-Mozer, 2005). The first model Barbara Krauz-Mozer described as an-
alytical-empiricist, assuming the existence of external reality accessible via em-
pirical research, the second one was labelled as hermeneutic-humanist. Krauz-
Mozer presented the hermeneutic-humanist approach as internally diversified, 
including concepts so diverse as emphatic understanding of Max Weber’s and 
radical post-modern statements denying the possibility of external “truth”, and it 
seems clear that interpretive approaches (diverse as they are) bear much resem-
blance to and can be analysed within the hermeneutic-humanist model.
Furlong and Marsh clearly opposed positivist and intepretivist approaches, 
when presenting distinctions between what is scientific (also called positivist) 
and what is hermeneutic (or interpretivist). They also mentioned a possibility to 
add a third position, a realist one, thus further deepening the discussion. When 
describing the interpretivist tradition, they focused on “the meaning of behav-
iour” (Furlong, Marsh, 2010, p. 192), and understanding rather than explaining. 
Assuming (as mentioned above) that “the world is socially or discursively con-
structed”, and thus knowledge “theoretically or discursively laden”, the interpre-
tivists “operate within discourses and traditions” (2010, p. 199).
In a similar manner, Bevir in his introduction to the first volume of “Inter-
pretive political science” (2010a) clearly contrasted interpretivism with positiv-
ism. Despite the fact that interpretation played a prominent role in origins and 
roots of political science, such as history, law and philosophy, he claimed that 
so-called modernists and positivists of the twentieth century “tried to model po-
litical science on their view of the natural sciences as concerned with laws and 
regularities that governed social life irrespective of the beliefs of individuals 
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and the meanings found in a society” (2010a, p. xxii). Clearly, interpretivism 
suggests an alternative approach.
Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes in their chapter on the interpretive theory to the 
second edition of “Theory and methods in political science” (Bevir, Rhodes, 
2002)1, again focused on meanings shaping actions and institutions, and the as-
sumption shared by many variances of interpretivism that “we cannot under-
stand human affairs properly unless we grasp the relevant meanings” (2002, 
p. 2). Bevir and Rhodes identified two main strands of the contemporary inter-
pretive theory: one rooted in history and generally humanities, and the second 
drawing inspiration from post-structuralist and post-modern thoughts.
When talking about fundamental premises of interpretivism, Bevir and 
Rhodes analysed the assumption that “people act on their beliefs and prefer- 
ences” (2002, p. 4), implying that beliefs and preferences are causes for human 
actions. In doing so, they directly referred to one of the great debates in political 
science, namely “the [mere] possibility of a science of politics” (2002, p. 6). Since 
there is no external, empirically verifiable evidence of those beliefs, it is hard to 
imagine explaining causal relations (natural sciences alike) between behaviour 
and cognitive processes. What the authors suggested instead was explaining hu-
man actions by identifying “conditional and volitional links between beliefs, de-
sires, intentions and actions”, calling it “a narrative form of explanation” (2002, 
p. 6).
Furthermore, Bevir and Rhodes presented their own approach. They de-
fended the concept of agency of subjects making conscious choices motivated 
by their beliefs and values, even if restricted or influenced by social structures 
surrounding them. They suggested seeing social structures as ‘traditions’ acting 
“as the background” (2002, p. 15) to future actions chosen by individuals. These 
traditions were next defined as “theories or narratives, and associated practices” 
set in a given historical context but also “constantly evolving” (2002, p. 15). Also, 
they defended the concept of objectivity, though defined in a peculiar way and 
resting on comparing narratives rather than refuting them.
1 I used the version available online, as well as the Polish translation (Marsh, Stoker, 2006). In 
the third edition quoted before, published in 2010, the chapter on interpretive theory was 
replaced by the chapter on constructivism and interpretive theory by Craig Parsons, focusing 
on constructivism. Also, in the newest, fourth edition (2017), contains the chapter by Parsons. 
As this article explores interpretive theories, and Parsons does not pay significant attention to 
them, focusing on constructivist approaches instead, I have chosen the previous editions for 
my analysis.
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Interpretivism in a broader context of social sciences
While this paper focuses on the interpretivism, it is worth noting its relation with 
similar approaches, or paradigms. Quite often interpretivism is discussed along 
with the concept of constructivism. Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow 
in a book devoted to interpretive research design (2012) (discussed in detail in 
the later sections of that paper) even used the compound ‘constructivist-inter-
pretivist’ in order to describe methodology assuming the existence of multiple, 
intersubjectively constructed “truths” (2012, p. 4). In fact, they did define “in-
terpretivism” as encompassing “a broad array of schools with a variety of specif-
ic methods that are united by their constructivist ontological and interpretive 
epistemological presuppositions” (2012, p. 141), though they also noted the pos-
sibility of combining a constructivist ontology with an objectivist epistemology, 
as they suggested is characteristic of Wendt’s works (2012, p. 145).
Another alternative approach can be found in Creswell’s work on research 
design (2009), where he presented four philosophical worldviews, defined as 
“general orientations about the world and the nature of research” (2009, p. 6). 
He distinguished postpositivism, constructivism, pragmatism and an advocacy/
participatory worldview. When describing the social constructivist worldview, 
Creswell referred to the assumption that “individuals seek understanding of the 
world in which they live and work”, and also that “the [research] participants 
can construct the meaning of a situation, typically forged in discussions or in-
teractions with other persons” (2009, p. 8). Similarities between such a perspec-
tive and interpretivism are undeniable, Creswell also mentioned that these two 
perspectives are often combined, without exploring the potential differences be-
tween them.
Another source to consult would be the book by Michael Crotty, “The Foun-
dations of Social Research” (Crotty, 1998). Crotty described the research pro-
cess via the image of scaffolding, and four basic elements: methods, methodolo-
gy, a theoretical perspective supporting chosen methodology, and epistemology 
informing the theoretical perspective. He further defined a theoretical perspec-
tive as “a philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing 
a context for the process and grounding its logic and criteria” and epistemology 
as “a theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby 
in the methodology” (1998, p. 3). In Crotty’s view, constructionism is one of the 
epistemologies, while interpretivism a theoretical perspective (1998, p. 5).
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Varieties of interpretation
When discussing various interpretative approaches, scholars usually start from 
hermeneutics, understood as a theory of understanding texts and actions (Bev-
ir, 2010a). They refer also to phenomenology and ethnography focusing on “dif-
ferent forms of common-sense knowledge” (2010a, p. xxx). More recent in-
spirations for interpretive theories are drawn from post-structuralism and 
post-foundationalism.
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to give justice to all the internal 
discussions interpretivists held themselves (cf. Bachryj-Krzywaźnia, 2016a), it 
is useful to trace back and name several prominent contributors to the debate, 
bearing in mind that such a list is never complete nor satisfactory.2 One of the 
first names brought forward by Michael Gibbons in his article on hermeneu-
tics, political inquiry and practical reason (2010) is Wilhelm Dilthey. Analys-
ing the difference between human sciences and natural sciences, Dilthey em-
phasized the significance of an “inner psychic dimension” (2010, p. 4) of human 
behaviour. As human sciences are to explore this inner reality, they need to turn 
to “literature, art, language, historical documents, laws, rituals, and institutions” 
through which it is “expressed or externalized” (2010, p. 4). The second person 
commonly referred to is Max Weber with his emphasis put on the process of un-
derstanding (Verstehen).
According to Gibbons, the ascendency of positivist approaches in political 
science was not challenged until the late 1960s and 1970s. Then, critics started 
pointing out that the processes of power inclusion and exclusion were not sat-
isfactorily recognized and analyzed by the proponents of the empiricist-behav-
iouralist approach. Thomas Kuhn’s conceptualization of paradigms shifts was 
also used by some, notably by Sheldon Wolin, to criticize the shortcomings of 
behaviouralism as a sign of the inadequacy of a positivist approach. Gibbons re-
ferred in addition to the work of Peter Winch, “The Idea of a Social Science”, 
who – building on works of Weber and Wittgenstein – sought to explain and un-
derstand human action by taking into account “the intentions, ideas and con-
cepts available to the actors involved in the behaviour and institutions in ques-
tion” (2010, p. 6).
Gibbons credited both Gadamer and Taylor for contributing to a turning 
point in the development of interpretive approaches, by further examining and 
elaborating the significance of the role of language in the context of social 
and political action. This emphasis on language and social practices helped over-
2 For instance I do acknowledge that Gibbons’ reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer differs from 
the account presented by Thomas Schwandt in his article on three epistemological stances for 
qualitative inquiry (2010), but the thorough analysis of these considerations goes beyond the 
scope of this paper.
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come the limits of verstehen approach understood to focus on subjective inten-
tions of actors. As Gibbons wrote, “one implication [of this language signifi-
cance] (…) that distinguishes hermeneutic interpretation from verstehen, is that 
the interpretative understanding must go beyond the subjective intentions of 
actors” (2010, p. 8). The fact that ideas are being embedded in social practices 
must be recognized and acknowledged. As Gibbons asserted, the key to under-
standing of hermeneutic-interpretive perspective is to accept an embodied self, 
meaning that “it is always already situated in a historical-linguistic communi-
ty that embodies a range and horizon of possible personal and public identity” 
(2010, p. 10).
Bevir in his introduction to interpretive political science (2010a) decides to 
look closer at Michel Foucault’s post-structuralism as the inspiration for new in-
terpretive approaches. Foucault clearly opposes the possibility of pure experi-
ence, claiming that objects and actions came to existence only via discourse/lan-
guage. As such, “human life is understandable only in a framework of meaning 
and this framework of meaning cannot be reduced to an objective process or 
structure” (2010a, p. xxxi). Bevir underlies Foucault’s unique hostility towards 
subject and reason, the subject seen as far from being autonomous, instead cap-
tured or even “a contingent product of particular discourses, techniques of pow-
er, and technologies of the self ” (2010a, p. xxxii). This tension between elder 
and newer varieties of interpretative theory, according to Bevir, centres around 
the concepts of reason and subject, the elder ones seeing both of them almost as 
“pure and universal” (2010a, p. xxxii), the newer denying their autonomy.
Methodological implications of the interpretive approach
While exploring the links between ontological, epistemological and method-
ological choices, it seems valuable to refer again to Peregrine Schwartz-Shea 
and Dvora Yanow’s “Interpretive Research Design” (2012). They emphasized 
the uniqueness of interpretive research projects, focusing on “specific, situat-
ed meanings and meaning-making practices of actors in a given context” (2012, 
p. 1). They touched the issue of the existence of ‘real’ world external to research-
ers and the contestable concept of truth.
Interpretivism focusing on meaning-making processes draws heavily from 
ideas derived from hermeneutics and phenomenology. When presenting the list 
of those, Shea and Yanow started with the concept of the artefact embodying the 
meaning significant to its creator “at the time of [its] (…) creation” (2012, p. 42), 
thus implying that meanings and knowledge are always contextual and situated. 
In this view, the process of meaning-making is seen as a social practice, drawing 
from “lived experience” (2012, pp. 42–43).
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Schwartz-Shea and Yanow showed that the same method can be used by re-
searchers adopting different, conflicting even methodologies. Using the exam-
ple of the interview, which can be conducted in order to establish “what really 
happened” thus relying on “a realist-objectivist methodology”, or on the con-
trary, the same technique of the interview may be used by the researcher follow-
ing “a constructivist-interpretivist methodology” believing in “the existence of 
(potentially) multiple, intersubjectively constructed «truths»” (2012, p. 4). Fur-
thermore, these understandings, or interpretations of the events are not exter-
nal to the researcher, but rather they are co-generated, construed via interactions 
between the interviewer and the interviewed, as both of them attempt to “make 
those interpretations legible to each other” (2012, p. 4).
What is particularly interesting is the fact that Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
contest a well-established in literature dichotomic distinction between quantita-
tive and qualitative research, instead suggesting differentiating between quanti-
tative, qualitative and interpretive research. Such an approach allows identifying 
two variances of qualitative research, one drawing from realist-objectivist prem-
ises (labelled followingly as qualitative), and the second, relying on a construc-
tivist-interpretivist approach, called interpretive.3
When analyzing and presenting the process of working on research design, 
Shea and Yanow again emphasized the necessity of addressing all the ontologi-
cal, epistemological and methodological issues discussed before (2012, pp. 18–
19). The authors suggested that the reviewers focus on the logical link be- 
tween the proposal research question and the chosen methods. They also pos-
tulated the integration of ethical dilemmas connected with research into de-
signs, thus underlining their significance, especially within the framework of 
interpretivism.
When presenting the logics of inquiry, Shea and Yanow captivated the atten-
tion of a reader by a powerful image of a researcher likened to a captain of a ship. 
They explained that the interpretive research is not linear, nor does it start with 
a set of formal hypotheses. In order to explore that notion further, and also make 
the distinction between positivist and interpretivist modes of inquiry more ac-
cessible, they described the unique process of reasoning in quite a detail. Again, 
they challenged a typical assumption of the dichotomic distinction between 
quantitative research following a deductive logic – “reasoning that begins with 
theories, which lead to hypotheses, from which testable concepts are generated 
and then tested” (2012, p. 27), and qualitative research following an inductive 
3 The authors accept that – for greater clarity – they should be using three compound adjectives 
to describe these three research approaches, i.e. quantitative-positivist methods, qualitative-
positivist methods and qualitative-interpretive methods, yet they adopt the shorter versions 
„to make the language simpler” (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow, 2012, p. 6).
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logic. Instead, they suggested an abductive4 logic of inquiry as the one inform-
ing interpretive research. Abduction then starts with what they called a puzzle, 
a surprise, a riddle to solve. The puzzles might be born out of a tension or a dif-
ference between the expectations fed by the academic literature and the experi-
ence of the field, or else by two contrasting events/experiences or conversations. 
It is quite important to acknowledge that the researchers do not start their ac-
tivities tabulae rasae, but with some prior knowledge which led them to discov-
er the very riddle or puzzle that they are now set to solve. The pattern of solving 
the puzzle, in other words formulating the interpretation or the explanation that 
“would render the surprise less surprising” (2012, p. 28), is then circular-spiral in 
its nature, and the process of reasoning labelled iterative-recursive.
The circular or spiral pattern of the interpretive research following the logic 
of abduction suggests that there are no final conclusions, in some way such re-
search (or a journey) never ends. Quoting from Shea and Yanow again, “there 
are only momentary stopping points, to collect one’s thoughts, perhaps to pub-
lish or otherwise disseminate what one understands at that point in time” (2012, 
pp. 30–31).
The authors acknowledged the challenge of preparing a successful inter-
pretive research proposal expected to “stipulate ahead of time” (Schwartz-Shea, 
Yanow, 2012, p. 33), before the field experience, desired results. If the conduct 
of research is to remain open, dynamic and flexible, the research design must 
reflect it. This is the context when this powerful image of a captain was used – 
instead of blindly following a course drawn on a dry paper map, a researcher 
adapts to changing weather conditions and is able to ride the waves.
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow criticized the interpretive methodologists for ob-
scuring the process of theorizing in their research by overemphasizing the need 
for concepts to “emerge from the field” (2012, p. 38). It might have led propo-
nents of other epistemic communities to conclude that an interpretive research-
er is free from any prior knowledge when entering the research field. Not only it 
is not possible but also such an assumption is confusing in terms of broader in-
ter-paradigm methodological discussions. The authors attributed this confusion 
to misunderstandings of Glaser and Strauss’s “grounded theory” approach. Shea 
and Yanow explained that it would be a mistake to assume that researchers mere-
ly transfer concepts as coined or expressed by research participants. Researchers 
should be understood as sense-makers, instead of messengers.
4 The usage of the abductive logic of reasoning in the context of political science, has also been 
described by Filip Pierzchalski (2013).
Interpretive Theories in Political Science 39
Methodological choices inspired by interpretivism
Even though, as Bevir claimed, there is no particular method or topic logically 
tied to the interpretive theories (Bevir, 2010b), there is clearly a preference for 
qualitative methods and techniques (cf. Crotty, 1998; Creswell, 2009). As it has 
been mentioned before, we should differentiate qualitative-positivist and qual-
itative-interpretivist methods (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow, 2012, p. 6), and it is still 
hard to imagine quantitative-interpretivist methods.
The final section of the article will be thus devoted to the concept of inter-
pretive-qualitative methods and techniques. As Ariadne Vromen stated in her 
chapter “Debating Methods: Rediscovering Qualitative Approaches”, “the focus 
of qualitative methods in political science is on detailed, text-based answers that 
are often historical or include personal reflection from participants in political 
institutions, events, issues or processes” (2010, p. 249). Even though qualitative 
methods tend to be used more by those adopting a non-positivist epistemolog-
ical position, it is still possible for those representing a positivist epistemologi-
cal stance to be using it as well, so the difference – crucial from the perspective 
of this article – is, according to Vromen – “based on claims made about expla-
nation, purpose and goals of research itself ” (2010, p. 249). Schwartz-Shea and 
Yanow also touched that issue, when examining the risks of mixing methodolo-
gies and underlying those methodologies philosophical assumptions about real-
ity (2012, pp. 130–135).
What might work here as a useful reminder is the fact that a descriptive qual-
itative approach dominated in political science for many years, with its tradition-
al focus on political theory and legal and political institutions. However, this tra-
dition has been challenged by positivist methodology and now it seems we are 
witnessing the dominance of quantitative methods, at least in some scholar com-
munities (Vromen, 2010).5
Vromen discussed certain techniques, as she put it, “more oriented to pro-
ducing qualitative data” (2010, p. 258). She mentioned in-depth interviews, fo-
cus groups, ethnography, but also text/document based techniques. Among the 
latter, Vromen distinguished between historiography, which she linked with 
the school of historical institutionalism, more interested in process tracing, 
and the interpretivist discourse analysis. This interpretive approach “locates the 
interpretation of texts within an analysis of broader social, political and cultur-
al processes” (2010, p. 264). Vromen referred to works of Norman Fairclough 
who in his analytical framework identifies both micro analysis of vocabulary 
5 Here Vromen used the example of the US-based political science where the majority of research 
published in top journals uses positivist quantitative methodology (2010, pp. 250–251).
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and structure of texts and meso analysis of “the social production of texts” (2010, 
p. 264).6
Conclusions
This paper meant to explore the promise of interpretive political science, con-
tributing to our understanding of human action and behaviour. The abundance 
of literature points to the internal diversity of the field, ongoing discussion on 
many varieties of interpretive theories, and the continuing debate between posi-
tivist and interpretivist approaches. The debate seems to not only enrich the field 
but also foster higher scientific reflexivity. Communicating the research results 
to members of different “epistemic communities” (Schwartz-Shea, Yanow, 2012, 
pp. 130–135) requires clear articulation (and so own understanding) of one’s 
own ontological and epistemological presuppositions.
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